

Shareholders of ASKA Pharmaceutical Holdings Co., Ltd.

Shareholders of Bunka Shutter Co., Ltd.

Market Participants and Media Representatives

September 10, 2025

ASKA Pharmaceutical Holdings Co., Ltd. introduced a "Response Policy on Large-Scale Purchase of Shares" targeting Dalton Investments, Inc. and our co-holders (hereinafter referred to as "Dalton") on August 25, 2025. Bunka Shutter Co., Ltd. introduced a "Response Policy on Large-Scale Purchase of Shares" targeting Dalton on September 3, 2025. (hereinafter collectively referred to as the "Policies"). ASKA Pharmaceutical Holdings Co., Ltd. and Bunka Shutter Co., Ltd. are collectively referred to as the "Companies".

Key Points of Our Position

1. Our Proposals Aim to Enhance Corporate Value and Shareholder Interests

All engagement activities, including shareholder proposals, undertaken by Dalton are aimed at enhancing the corporate value and common interests of shareholders of the companies in which we invest (hereinafter referred to as "Investee Companies").

2. We do not "coerce or steer" toward specific options

We encourage the management of our Investee Companies to consider and make decisions on all management options, including going private, but we do not force or steer them toward any specific option.

3. The terms of going private are "determined by the Board of Directors."

The terms of going private are determined by the Board of Directors. We do not participate in determining these terms, nor do we create conflicts of interest among shareholders.

4. The free trading of shares and the principle of shareholder equality are "inalienable" critical market mechanisms.

The free trading of shares in the market and the principle of shareholder equality are fundamental principles for the development of capital markets. Management must not be permitted to easily distort these fundamental principles for their own self-preservation.

1. "All our engagement activities, including shareholder proposals, aim to enhance the corporate value of our Investee Companies and the common interests of shareholders."

- We are honored to be the investor that has submitted the most shareholder proposals in the Japanese stock market on themes such as capital policy, aligning management and shareholder interests, corporate governance, and advanced compliance with Tokyo Stock Exchange requirements. All these contribute to the common interests of shareholders.
- Specifically, we demand all Investee Companies address three key areas through shareholder proposals: (1) improving balance sheets, (2) aligning management and shareholder interests, and (3) enhancing governance, including having a majority of outside directors.
- While shareholder proposals themselves are mostly rejected, many Investee Companies voluntarily implement measures aligned with their content. The resulting improvements in corporate value and stock price valuation have contributed to the interests of all shareholders. We have consistently commended numerous management initiatives aimed at enhancing corporate value and stock price valuation during meetings with Investee Companies, confirming that many executives are conscious of increasing shareholder value.
- If our sole objective were delisting, we would have no incentive to engage in activities that enhance corporate value and the common interests of shareholders.

2. "We encourage management of our Investee Companies to consider and decide on all management options, including going private, but we do not force or steer them toward any specific option."

- From the perspective of enhancing corporate value and the common interests of shareholders, the consideration and decision-making regarding all management options (including spin-offs and business divestitures), including going private, is the responsibility and judgment of the management of the listed companies, not ours.
- As a general principle, while we urge management with incentives for the status quo to consider all management options and make decisions with appropriate speed, we do not force or guide them toward any specific option.
- Historically, we have supported management decisions not to pursue delisting or similar actions when such decisions were deemed appropriate from the perspective of enhancing corporate value and the common interests of shareholders.

3. "The terms of going private are determined by the Board of Directors. We do not participate in setting these terms and do not create conflicts of interest among shareholders."

- There are claims that our track record of reinvestment creates a "conflict of interest between shareholders who want to sell high and shareholders who want to buy low." However, the decision to go private and the terms, including price, are determined by the Board of Directors, and we do not participate in this process. Therefore, this claim is clearly erroneous.
- We have neither the intention nor the ability to directly influence the decision or conditions for implementing the going private transaction.
- Our reinvestment was conducted under all conditions determined by the Board of Directors

and on the same terms as other investors.

4: "The free trading of shares in the market and the principle of shareholder equality are fundamental principles for the development of capital markets. Management must not be permitted to easily distort these fundamental principles for their own self-preservation."

- The free trading of shares in the market is a fundamental principle of an open capital market. Management of both companies should recognize that recklessly distorting this principle is not merely a matter for the parties involved, but an act that undermines the efforts and achievements in capital market reform built up by the Tokyo Stock Exchange and the government.
- Furthermore, the disclosures by both companies suggest the possibility of a MoM resolution at a shareholder confirmation meeting.
- **A MoM resolution is an act that attempts to distort not only market principles but also the principles of the Companies Act by excluding the voting rights of specific shareholders at a shareholders' intent confirmation general meeting.**
- With little fact-based verification and while touching on past cases, the management of both companies—who are not even parties involved—have disclosed the Response Policies. They have done so by propagating highly ambiguous "concerns", while either refusing to respond to our calls for dialogue or selectively interpreting the content of our discussions to suit their own "concerns" based on arbitrary speculation and interpretation. The management of these two companies, who disclosed the Response Policies, must be said to lack the integrity expected of executives of listed companies. In particular, their arbitrary interpretation of our other Investee Companies, with whom we have friendly relationships, is an act of the utmost discourtesy.
- As stated in the Corporate Governance Code, measures intended to achieve the effect of takeover defense must not be aimed at "management self-preservation." The actions of the management of both companies—disclosing unfounded and inaccurate facts, manipulating information to mislead other shareholders, and depriving shareholders holding around 20% of their freedom to trade shares in the open market—are nothing other than self-preservation. This stems from a mere aversion to the proposal of going private and an inability to deny the risk that our holding over 20% of the shares could hinder the maximization of corporate value or the common interests of shareholders.

James B. Rosenwald III

Founding Partner and Chief Investment Officer of Dalton Investments, Inc